Direct answer
What Is a Climate Club?
A climate club conditions market access on membership in a common carbon-pricing regime, using trade penalties to deter free-riding rather than simply adjusting import prices.
Parent topic: Climate Clubs and Carbon Border Adjustments
A climate club is a coalition whose members adopt a common carbon price and impose trade penalties on nonmembers. Nordhaus (2015) formalizes the idea as a response to free-riding in international climate policy. Emissions reductions benefit all countries, but each government would prefer that others bear the cost. A club raises the trade cost of remaining outside the agreement.
How the mechanism works
Members agree on a carbon price, or an equivalent emissions-reduction commitment, and maintain normal trade relations with one another. Nonmembers face discriminatory tariffs or reduced market access. If remaining outside is more costly than complying, including for countries with high abatement costs, every country joins. The threat of a penalty then sustains participation without being used, and trade among all countries remains free.
What the quantitative evidence shows
Farrokhi and Lashkaripour (2025) place this mechanism in a calibrated general-equilibrium model with 64 countries and 40 sectors. They compare unilateral carbon pricing, border carbon adjustments, and a climate club with contingent trade penalties. Border taxes deliver 3.4 percent of the globally optimal carbon reduction. The climate club delivers 33 to 68 percent, depending on the penalty structure and degree of coordination. The difference arises because a border adjustment changes one price margin, whereas the club also changes governments' incentives to participate.
Why redistribution may be necessary
Universal participation requires every country to prefer membership to staying out. This condition is harder to satisfy for countries whose comparative advantage lies in carbon-intensive production and whose abatement costs are therefore high. Farrokhi, Lashkaripour, and Taheri (2025) show that incorporating the club mechanism into trade agreements, with revenues redistributed through a Global Climate Fund, can sustain participation at a carbon price near $119 per ton of CO2. Without redistribution, the coalition may remain limited to rich countries with relatively low abatement costs.
Related papers
Can Trade Policy Mitigate Climate Change?
This paper asks whether trade policy can solve free-riding in climate cooperation. It shows that ordinary border taxes do little on their own, while climate-club style penalties can deliver much larger emissions cuts.
A Framework for Integrating Climate Goals into Trade Agreements
This paper develops a framework for embedding carbon pricing into existing trade agreements. It highlights why climate-compatible trade integration may require both contingent market access rules and international redistribution.
Related topics
Trade Policy
Quantitative work on tariffs, retaliation, trade agreements, and the design of trade policy in distorted open economies.
Related topicWTO and Trade Agreements
Trade agreements restrain retaliation, support global value chains, and coordinate policy spillovers arising from market power, scale economies, and carbon emissions.
Key questions
Is a climate club just a carbon tariff?
No. A carbon tariff adjusts the price of imports to reflect their carbon content. A climate club uses trade penalties, which may include tariffs, to induce countries to join a common carbon-pricing regime. In Farrokhi and Lashkaripour (2025), border carbon taxes alone deliver 3.4 percent of the globally optimal emissions reduction, whereas contingent club penalties deliver 33 to 68 percent. The first policy corrects an import price; the second addresses participation.
Ahmad Lashkaripour